QUICKLOOK: Disrupting Satellite Communications: The Power of Low Earth Orbit Constellations
PDF debrief: The Cumulative Impact of Commercial Off-The-Shelf Solutions in Satellite Interference
What is meant by “COTS satellite technology”:
The use of Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components and open-source software in satellite technology can significantly boost innovation in the space industry. These tools can reduce costs and speed up development, making space technology more accessible to a wider range of entities, including smaller companies, startups, and educational institutions. This increased accessibility can foster competition and collaboration, leading to a surge in innovative ideas and solutions. Standardization, another outcome of using COTS components, can enhance interoperability between different systems, further driving innovation. However, while these tools can be transformative, they also pose potential security risks, necessitating careful implementation.
Documents in review
Background:
Satellites in Geostationary Orbit (GEO) have long been the backbone of various commercial, government, and military services worldwide, facilitating everything from surveillance and monitoring to video calls and internet access. However, the recent dramatic decrease in the cost-per-kilogram to space has led to an explosion in the number of smaller satellites in LEO, both existing and planned.
These LEO constellations are managed remotely, and the study considers a scenario where an attacker gains control over the constituent satellites. The aim is to understand the potential damage this attacker could cause, particularly by using the satellites to generate interference.
The researchers simulate a number of existing and planned LEO constellations against an example GEO constellation to ground their analysis. The model shows that, with conservative power estimates, both current and planned constellations could disrupt GEO satellite services at every ground station considered. The effectiveness of this disruption varies considerably between locations.
The study also analyzes different patterns of interference, how they reflect the structures of the constellations creating them, and how effective they might be against a number of legitimate services. The findings suggest that real-time usage (e.g., calls, streaming) would be most affected, with three constellation designs able to generate thousands of outages of 30 seconds or longer over the course of the day across all ground stations.
Introduction:
Space infrastructure forms the backbone of numerous services that the world heavily relies on, including Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) for navigation and timing, broadcast media, and internet access in remote areas. Traditionally, the development and deployment of space infrastructure were so costly and complex that only the most well-funded government and commercial entities could access it. However, a 'New Space' revolution is currently underway, making orbital operations accessible to a much larger number of entities. This revolution is fueled by the development of flexible, commodity hardware, multi-tenanted launches, and an ecosystem of support services.
This significant expansion in the quantity of space infrastructure, coupled with the emergence of new services (which present more attack surfaces), and the ease with which more participants can launch their own satellites, has led to a novel potential for Downlink Interference Attacks (DIAs) by current and future constellations. Despite the substantial disparity in transmission power between the attacker and victim satellites, the difference in orbital distance and the far greater number of potential attacking satellites make such an attack crucial to consider.
Drawing parallels with terrestrial Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, which typically use 'botnets' composed of thousands of compromised computers to disrupt services across the internet, the paper explores whether the planned multi-thousand satellite constellations might represent a similar threat. These constellations would operate on slightly different principles, relying on the fact that with a sufficiently dense constellation, there will always be a satellite close to the line between the victim satellite and ground station, where interference would be strongest. Yet, the same attack vector exists: thousands of near-identical systems that cannot be air-gapped and could potentially be compromised from almost anywhere on Earth.
Summary:
GEO satellites play a crucial role in delivering a wide range of services that are integral to commercial, governmental, and military operations globally. These services encompass everything from surveillance and monitoring to video calls and internet access. However, the recent surge in the deployment of LEO satellite constellations, driven by the democratization of space technology and the development of Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) solutions, poses a potential threat to the stability of these GEO satellite services.
To understand the extent of this threat, the researchers conducted simulations using both existing and planned LEO constellations, comparing their potential impact against a representative GEO constellation. The results of these simulations were concerning. They revealed that both current and future LEO constellations could disrupt GEO satellite services at all ground stations considered in the study.
The disruptions were found to vary in pattern, reflecting the structures of the constellations causing them. Most notably, real-time services, such as phone calls and streaming, were identified as being the most vulnerable to interference. This is particularly significant given the increasing reliance on real-time communications in today's digital age.
This study serves as a critical reminder of the importance of strategic planning and careful consideration in the deployment and management of satellite constellations. As the space industry continues to evolve and grow, it is crucial to address these potential challenges to ensure the continued safe and effective use of satellite technology. The findings underscore the need for further research and the development of mitigation strategies to prevent the disruption of vital satellite services.
Assessment:
Based on the research conducted in the paper, the assessment of the impact of COTS and open-source satellites on satellite interference is multifaceted. The study reveals that the interference generated by different LEO constellations can be substantial, and this interference is affected by the location of the receiver. The paper also identifies that certain current or planned constellations could be more effective and therefore potentially more appealing as targets of malware. Different legitimate uses of GEO satellites are affected in various ways by this interference.
In terms of the conclusion, the paper emphasizes that the potential for interference and its effectiveness is likely to increase as constellations grow larger. However, the power requirement for such an attack is beyond the reach of all but large companies like SpaceX, OneWeb, and Amazon, who are willing to invest in producing a constellation of such satellites. Therefore, it is unlikely that a constellation dedicated to this attack would be feasible. However, targeting an existing or planned constellation continues to be a viable option, and the security policies of satellite operators should reflect this.
The paper suggests that comprehensive external code reviews, adversarial analysis, and continual monitoring would all help to ensure system integrity. The use of off-the-shelf software like Linux is excellent for rapid development and use of existing libraries, but it also lowers the barrier to entry for malicious attacks, which can have consequences far beyond the company compromised. The potential mitigations mentioned in the paper go some way towards alleviating the potency of such an attack, though these rely on more capable and therefore expensive receivers, which may limit their implementation.
Conclusion:
The power requirement for such an attack is beyond the reach of all but large companies like SpaceX, OneWeb, and Amazon, who are willing to invest in producing a constellation of such satellites. Therefore, it is unlikely that a constellation dedicated to this attack would be feasible. Targeting an existing or planned constellation continues to be a viable option, and the security policies of satellite operators should reflect this.
The paper suggests that comprehensive external code reviews, adversarial analysis, and continual monitoring would all help to ensure system integrity. The use of off-the-shelf software like Linux is excellent for rapid development and use of existing libraries, but it also lowers the barrier to entry for malicious attacks, which can have consequences far beyond the company compromised. The potential mitigations mentioned in the paper go some way towards alleviating the potency of such an attack, though these rely on more capable and therefore expensive receivers, which may limit their implementation.
In summary, while the democratization of space technology has led to increased innovation and accessibility, it also poses significant challenges that need to be addressed to ensure the continued safe and effective use of satellite technology.