QUICKLOOK: Dissecting the Disparities: U.S. vs. Chinese Vulnerability Databases
A Technical Examination of Vulnerability Reporting and Its Implications in Cybersecurity
Background on CNNVD: China's Strategic Tool in Cybersecurity with Historical Context
The China National Vulnerability Database (CNNVD) stands as a testament to China's commitment and focus on cybersecurity. As the digital age progresses, nations worldwide recognize the importance of safeguarding their digital infrastructures, and China is no exception. The CNNVD serves as a centralized repository for cataloging software vulnerabilities, potential threats, and associated metadata. However, its role extends beyond that of a mere database; it's a strategic tool that offers insights into China's cybersecurity priorities and potential areas of interest.
Historically, China's emphasis on the CNNVD has been driven by multiple factors. Firstly, as one of the world's leading technological powers, China is home to a vast digital infrastructure that requires robust protection. The CNNVD aids in this endeavor by providing timely information on vulnerabilities, allowing for swift mitigation. For instance, in 2017, a comparative study between the U.S. National Vulnerability Database (NVD) and CNNVD highlighted that CNNVD was more prompt in reporting vulnerabilities, often outpacing the NVD. This efficiency underscores China's commitment to staying ahead in the cybersecurity domain.
However, the CNNVD's operations have sparked intrigue and speculation among cybersecurity experts worldwide. Given that the CNNVD operates under the purview of the Chinese Ministry of State Securities Technical Bureau, its data collection and reporting methodologies might be influenced by state-driven objectives. This association suggests that the vulnerabilities cataloged (or notably absent) in the CNNVD could provide insights into China's strategic interests, potential areas of research, and even its offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. A notable example of this was in 2017 when Recorded Future's research unveiled that the CNNVD had retroactively altered the initial publication dates of certain vulnerabilities, believed to be an attempt to mask their evaluation process for intelligence operations.
This database's strategic importance is further underscored by its historical promptness in reporting vulnerabilities. Such efficiency, while commendable, has led some experts to speculate that the CNNVD might be used as a tool to identify vulnerabilities of interest for intelligence operations before they are made public. For instance, vulnerabilities like CVE-2017-0199, which was linked to targeted attacks, saw its publication dates backdated in the CNNVD, raising questions about its use before public disclosure.
The CNNVD is more than just a vulnerability database; it's a reflection of China's strategic approach to cybersecurity. Its operations, influenced by state-driven objectives and historically evident manipulations, offer a window into China's cyber priorities and potential areas of focus. For those keen on understanding China's digital strategy, the CNNVD serves as a valuable resource, revealing as much through its inclusions as its omissions. Historical examples, such as the retroactive date alterations, further emphasize the need for a vigilant approach when interpreting its data.
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Summary: The U.S. National Vulnerability Database (NVD) consistently lags behind China's National Vulnerability Database (CNNVD) in reporting software vulnerabilities. On average, the NVD takes 33 days from the initial disclosure of a vulnerability to its inclusion in the database, while CNNVD takes only 13 days. This delay is primarily due to NVD's reliance on voluntary submissions of information. In contrast, CNNVD proactively gathers vulnerability data from various sources across the web. The U.S. approach results in significant gaps in timely vulnerability reporting, giving adversaries a potential advantage. To improve its efficacy, the NVD should adopt a more proactive approach, similar to CNNVD, ensuring timely and comprehensive vulnerability coverage.
Summary: The U.S. National Vulnerability Database (NVD) consistently lags behind China's National Vulnerability Database (CNNVD) in reporting software vulnerabilities. On average, the NVD takes 33 days from the initial disclosure of a vulnerability to its inclusion in the database, while CNNVD takes only 13 days. This delay is primarily due to NVD's reliance on voluntary submissions of information. In contrast, CNNVD proactively gathers vulnerability data from various sources across the web. The U.S. approach results in significant gaps in timely vulnerability reporting, giving adversaries a potential advantage. To improve its efficacy, the NVD should adopt a more proactive approach, similar to CNNVD, ensuring timely and comprehensive vulnerability coverage.
Summary: In November 2017, Recorded Future published research examining the publication speed for China’s National Vulnerability Database (CNNVD). While conducting that research, we discovered that China had a process for evaluating whether high-threat vulnerabilities had operational utility in intelligence operations before publishing them to the CNNVD. In revisiting that analysis, we discovered that CNNVD had altered their initial vulnerability publication dates in what we assess is an attempt to cover up that evaluation process.
Background:
In the intricate realm of cybersecurity, vulnerability databases are foundational pillars. These platforms serve as more than just repositories; they are critical infrastructures that systematically catalog potential threats, software vulnerabilities, and associated metadata. The U.S. National Vulnerability Database (NVD) and the China National Vulnerability Database (CNNVD) are two primary entities in this domain. Their operational methodologies and motivations have come under scrutiny due to observed discrepancies in their data reporting, timeliness, and granularity. These differences have sparked a series of technical and procedural questions, prompting experts to delve deeper into their operational nuances. The intricate disparities between these databases have instigated debates about their data sourcing algorithms and underlying motivations [Dr. Bill Ladd, Recorded Future, CTA-2017-1019].
Technical Dissection:
An intriguing data anomaly served as the catalyst for Del Rosso's analysis: a specific vulnerability, identified by its CVE identifier, was cataloged in the CNVD but was conspicuously absent from the U.S. NVD. This deviation wasn't a one-off incident. A meticulous analysis revealed a consistent pattern of such discrepancies, hinting at divergent vulnerability assessment methodologies between the two databases. The CNNVD, operating under the Chinese Ministry of State Securitys Technical Bureau, showcases operational tendencies that starkly diverge from global vulnerability reporting standards. Notably, there have been instances of retrospective alteration of disclosure dates for certain vulnerabilities. Such alterations can distort the perceived threat landscape, skewing critical metrics and potentially providing adversaries with a tactical advantage. Furthermore, there's evidence suggesting that the CNNVD might be supplying Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups with tailored exploit kits, indicating a potential state-backed cyber espionage infrastructure [China Altered Public Vulnerability Data, Priscilla Moriuchi and Dr. Bill Ladd, Recorded Future, CTA-2018-0309].
Technical Assessment and Implications:
The disparities between the U.S. NVD and the CNNVD are not just superficial data inconsistencies. They reflect deeper systemic, operational, and even philosophical differences in vulnerability management. The CNNVD's data modification practices, combined with its affiliations to espionage-driven entities, suggest a strategic, state-driven approach to vulnerability management. This contrasts with the NVD's more passive, industry-reliant approach. While the NVD adheres to industry standards and best practices, it might introduce reporting latency due to its dependency on voluntary submissions. For cybersecurity professionals, these findings emphasize the importance of understanding the complex interplay of data sources, geopolitical motivations, and operational methodologies. The proactive approach of CNNVD, backed by state resources, offers potential advantages in speed and comprehensiveness. However, its data manipulation practices raise concerns about data integrity and trustworthiness. Conversely, while the NVD might be slower, its adherence to industry standards and transparency make it a more reliable source, albeit with its challenges.
Conclusion:
As the landscape of cyber threats continues to evolve, the tools and databases designed to track and mitigate them must also adapt. The differences between the U.S. NVD and the CNNVD provide invaluable insights into the broader challenges of cybersecurity in an era marked by state-sponsored cyber operations, data manipulation, and geopolitical tensions. Organizations and cybersecurity professionals must recognize the significance of these differences. The key takeaway is the need for a diversified, multi-source approach to threat intelligence. This approach should be cognizant of potential biases, motivations, and operational methodologies of different sources. As cyber warfare becomes more intertwined with statecraft, a deep understanding of the technical nuances, key players, and their underlying motivations becomes paramount.