QUICKLOOK: Evolution of China's Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategy: A Perspective on US-China Relations
PDF debrief: Analyzing the Progression of China's A2/AD System Amidst the Dynamics of Sino-American Relations
Background Information:
China's Military Strategy and Development: China has been rapidly modernizing its military over the past few decades. A key part of this strategy has been the development of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities, which are designed to prevent or deter adversaries from entering or crossing a specific geographic area. This includes the development of advanced missile systems, electronic warfare capabilities, and cyber warfare capabilities.
U.S.-China Relations: The U.S. and China are the two largest economies in the world and have significant influence in international affairs. However, their relationship is complex and often marked by tension, particularly in the areas of trade, technology, and military power. The development of China's A2/AD capabilities is seen as a challenge to the U.S.'s military presence in the Asia-Pacific region.
Asia-Pacific Region: This region is of significant strategic importance due to its economic dynamism and complex security environment. It includes several U.S. allies, such as Japan and South Korea, and potential flashpoints like the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. has a significant military presence in the region, which China views as a potential threat.
Military Concepts and Terminology: Understanding military concepts like A2/AD, C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), and the principles of military deployment is crucial for understanding the strategic considerations described in the document.
International Security and Arms Control: The document discusses the arms race between the U.S. and China. Understanding the broader context of international security, arms control agreements, and the potential implications of this arms race is also important.
Introduction:
An in-depth analysis of China's Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities is presented. This strategy aims to prevent or deter adversaries from entering or crossing a specific geographic area. The A2/AD concept encompasses the development of countermeasures against attacks using conventional weapons, while the capabilities of nuclear forces and the concept of nuclear deterrence are viewed as separate parts of the armed forces and military strategy.
China's missile potential, which has seen rapid growth in the last decade in both nuclear and nonnuclear equipment, is also discussed. This includes a range of ballistic and cruise missiles, such as the Dongfeng series and the Donghai series. The Dongfeng series includes the Dongfeng-5/5A/5B and Dongfeng-31/31A/31AG ICBMs, and the Dongfeng-41, which is just being introduced into the combat structure of the PRC Rocket Force. The A2/AD potential also encompasses a number of anti-ship missiles that are in service in the Chinese Navy.
Event Summary:
Despite the adoption of the latest communication, intelligence, and surveillance systems, as well as the development of Electronic Warfare (EW), cyber and space warfare, potential interoperability problems persist within the Chinese military. There is a lack of experience in the use of the appropriate technologies and systems among the troops. A “technological gap” exists between PLA units that have the latest high-tech A2/AD systems and equipment and those that do not.
However, it is recognized that the overall capacity of China’s A2/AD assets has developed rapidly over the past ten years and will continue to strengthen in the coming years. The PLA aims to be ready to “win in informalized (network) local wars” with an emphasis on confrontation at sea and to win in “intellectual war” of a new type.
Assessment:
For the United States, China’s progress in the development of the A2/AD system has already led to consequences in the military-political and military-strategic sphere. This is reflected in doctrines of the use of force, concepts of combat operations, and principles of deploying US forces in the Asia-Pacific Region (APR).
The United States has been forced to adjust the principles for deploying its warships, aircraft (strike and reconnaissance), and military and naval bases in the region. The B-52 strategic bombers were recently redeployed from the island of Guam in the Pacific Ocean to North Dakota, thereby removing them from a potential strike from Chinese medium-range missiles. In 2020, plans were unveiled to increase funding to the US Indo–Pacific Command to equip joint forces, including those of US allies, with precision-guided (anti-ship and anti-aircraft) weapons.
Conclusion:
The development of China’s reconnaissance and anti-access/area denial systems has been active and significant. This has led to growing concerns among Western analysts about the consequences of these processes in the Asia-Pacific Region (APR). Both the United States and China have significantly strengthened their air and naval forces in the APR, along with their capabilities in the field of missile, cyber, and electronic weapons and anti-satellite systems.
The development of China’s A2/AD doctrine and the American concept of the AirSea Battle has led to an intensification of the arms race between the United States, China, and the APR countries in general. This has resulted in a reaction to the active development of China’s reconnaissance and anti-access/area denial systems.
The conclusion emphasizes that the United States should not rely on plans to destroy China’s A2/AD capabilities in the first phase of the conflict. Instead, it should focus on containment and de-escalation measures, while simultaneously increasing investment in combat platforms with increased survivability and in the development of its own A2/AD assets. This approach is seen as a more effective strategy in dealing with the growing A2/AD capabilities of China.